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31. Introduction
The main purpose of this paper is to present updated indices of central bank
independence (CBI) based on the latest legislation available, using the criteria of Grilli,
Masciandaro and Tabellini (1991) - henceforth GMT, and of Cukierman (1992) - henceforth
CUK. Our study includes all the countries covered by Grilli et al (1991) and Cukierman
(1992), plus a much larger number of emerging and developing countries from South-East
Asia, Eastern Europe1, Latin America and Africa. In addition we provide values for the
turnover of central bank governors (TOR) for all countries.
There are several reasons for writing this paper. The most obvious is that we have a
relatively large number of industrial and developing countries (90) whose legislation we have
analysed. Secondly, there appears to be no study that has attempted to construct all these
indices for such a large set of countries, and especially for developing countries2. Thirdly, we
have carefully documented how we have scored each of the criteria of the two indices. This is
of particular importance given the discrepancy between the interpretation of central banking
legislation. As Mangano (1998) has pointed out, in only one out of 17 countries originally
analysed in GMT and CUK, and for only one of the criteria, do the scores agree with one
another. In addition, Mangano finds that “they disagree in nearly 60% of countries when
deciding whether the CB is legally allowed to purchase Government debt in the primary
market or not.” Although we do not follow the detail of Mangano’s analysis, we evaluate the
CBI scores of each of the indices using simple correlations. We also compare our updated
indices with those reported in previous studies.
Central bank independence has been viewed in the theoretical literature as a means of
ensuring low inflation, without harming output or growth. Influential in the support for this
view has been the empirical work of Alesina and Summers (1993), Cukierman (1992) and
Grilli et al; (1991), all of whom have compiled (differing) indices of CBI. All these authors
have run regressions demonstrating their results, although a cursory glance at the relevant
graphs is convincing. Although Posen (1998) has questioned the conventional view, and has
demonstrated that some of the implications, in particular with regard to observations of
wages, are not in line with theory, it is not our intention here to grapple with these analytical
issues. Our aim is to update and analyse the CBI indices which have been the most influential
1 A more detailed analysis of the central bank legislation for ten of this group of countries has been conducted
by Hochreiter and Kowalski (2000) and for the whole group by Cukierman et al (2002).
2 To our knowledge, neither Grilli et al (1991) nor any other study has calculated the GMT index for
developing countries. Our calculation of the GMT index for both industrial and developing countries enables us
4in the empirical literature, and to compare them with more recent figures on inflation. A
follow-up study will incorporate various control variables and carry out an econometric
investigation of the CBI effects on inflation and output growth.
In addition to these two indices, we also calculate the turnover rate of Central Bank
governors (TOR). This was introduced in Cukierman (1992, p384) and de Haan and Kooi
(2000), and it was shown to be a reasonably good proxy for actual CBI, especially for
developing countries. We retain the approach taken in Radzyner and Riesinger (1997) and
Dvorsky (2000). Thus acting governors, usually for an interim period, are ignored, and
governors reappointed for a second or third term will be counted only once.
The world of the early 21st century is very different from that of 10 years ago, in
particular with regard to low inflation, increasing numbers of central banks becoming
independent, and lower unemployment in many OECD countries. Despite this, the continuing
research work on CBI largely draws on indices from the studies mentioned above. The only
exceptions appear to be the work of de Haan et al (1999), which updates Eijffinger and
Schaling (1993), but which uses a much smaller set of measures to compile the GMT index,
and Cukierman et al (2002), which updates Cukierman’s indices for the transition economies
of Eastern Europe. Ilieva and Gregoriou (2005) cover 22 of these countries for both GMT and
CUK, and in addition suggest a modified index specially tailored for the transition
economies, to include measures of changeability of central banking law, tradition, and the
existence of conflicting laws. Daunfeldt and de Luna (2003) appear to have updated measures
of CBI for 23 OECD countries, although no details are supplied; intriguingly, they show that
price stability precedes increased independence3.
In contrast to the above papers, our study provides a comprehensive cover for all
major CBI indices and most countries in the world for which legislation is available. One
important innovation of our work is that we have created a record of which articles of the
central banking Act for each country are relevant to each of the criteria of the CBI indices.
These will be available on the website of the Centre for International Capital Markets at
to provide a comprehensive comparison of central bank independence across countries.
3 Polillo and Guillen (2005) have coded the Cukierman index for 71 countries, but have neither
recorded the values in their paper, nor any of the details. Their work offers a sociological perspective, with the
hypothesis that countries compete to maintain their position and status, with increasing foreign exposure leading
to increased competition of this form.
5London Metropolitan University, and will enable other researchers to take issue with us on
our scoring.4
Section 2 discusses the theories behind CBI and motivates the construction of the
indices, with a discussion of central bank accountability. Section 3 discusses some of the
more detailed issues concerning the creation of the updated indices. Section 4 analyses the
relationship between the various measures of CBI, the ranking of countries, and compares the
new indices to those reported by previous studies. Section 5 examines how the CBI indices
relate to subsequent consumer price inflation. Section 6 concludes.
2. Independence, Accountability and Transparency
The theories behind CBI are grounded in the time inconsistency literature,
exemplified by Barro and Gordon (1983). If governments lack credibility, private agents
expect temporary boosts in demand from an increase in the money supply. This leads to
expectations of higher prices, and thereby higher wage demands. If governments were to shift
their preferences away from output stabilisation to inflation stabilisation, this would lead to a
lower inflation bias, but a greater volatility of output. Such a shift in government preferences,
other than when a new party comes into power, is unlikely to be taken seriously by economic
agents. As a consequence, this shift can only be effective if the government appoints an
agent, namely an independent central banker, with these preferences. As Rogoff (1985) has
shown, it is possible to obtain a second-best outcome by optimally choosing a banker with a
particularly desirable set of preferences.
Walsh (1995) and Persson & Tabellini (1993) have demonstrated that it is
theoretically possible to arrive at an optimal contract that will force the central banker to
behave in a way which is best for society as a whole. The contract creates incentives for the
central banker, which force him or her to act as though there were a negative inflation target.
These incentives could be in the form of bonuses on the attainment of a particular inflation
target, or penalties such as dismissal. However, as pointed out by McCallum (1997), this
contract represents a redistribution of the time inconsistency problem, since the government
may be unwilling to dismiss the central banker when the time comes. The anticipated
reneging of a contract which neither party, government or central banker, really wants, will
4 Together with our research assistant Jon Riley, sadly deceased, we read through the central bank legislation for
each country; if there was a disagreement, it was resolved by discussion and if necessary, majority decision.
Riley, in email correspondence with Cukierman, pointed out a number of discrepancies in the indices calculated
6alter the expectations of private agents, and lead to a re-emergence of the time-inconsistency
problem.
Both of the above approaches to monetary policy involve appointing an independent
central bank. In addition the ‘Walsh contract’, if it is to be effective, requires some kind of
accountability, so that Parliament and the electorate can judge whether the contract has been
adhered to. The importance of accountability has been pointed out by numerous authors such
as Fischer (1994) and Briault et al (1996). The latter refer to the ‘democratic deficit’ incurred
by delegating power to an unelected, unaccountable authority, in particular if it is permitted
to set the goals of monetary policy as well as to implement them. Persson & Tabellini (1993)
show that a reduction in central bank secrecy is important, since an optimal policy must be
supported by clear announcements. Nolan & Schaling (1996) develop a theoretical approach
to accountability, which is represented by uncertainty in the central bank’s stabilisation
preferences. The greater the degree of uncertainty, the higher will be inflation expectations.
Therefore, using the Rogoff (1985) notion of CBI, the lower is the degree of central bank
independence, the higher must be the optimal Nolan-Schaling degree of accountability. Using
the Briault et al (1996) indicator of central bank accountability, they find a negative
relationship with the Eijffinger & Schaling (1993) measure of CBI, which accords with their
theoretical result. However, further comparison by de Haan (1997) using the GMT and the
Cukierman indices showed no relationship. This motivated de Haan et al (1999) to propose a
more detailed set of indicators for central bank accountability.
The de Haan et al indicator uses 13 aspects of accountability, divided into three main
features: ultimate objectives, transparency and final responsibility of monetary policy. The
ultimate objectives aspect relates to the democratic deficit referred to earlier, and four
features are identified. These refer to whether the objectives are stipulated in central bank
law, whether they are clearly defined and prioritised, and if they are anywhere quantified.
Transparency, which relates to the Nolan & Schaling (1998) concept of accountability, covers
three features of public reporting of minutes and of success in meeting targets. The final
responsibility aspect concerns the bank’s relationship with Parliament, which covers override
mechanisms, dismissal of the governor and ease of changing central bank law.
de Haan et al (1999) go on to discuss why there need not be any correlation between
CBI and accountability. Firstly they note that in the Lohmann (1992) and Walsh (1995)
solutions, which are both welfare-enhancing, government bears final responsibility for
in Cukierman et al (2002). Cukierman graciously conceded in most cases.
7monetary policy; this measure of accountability is therefore negatively correlated with CBI.
The same may well be true of transparency, as discussed above. However if the ultimate
objective of the bank is price stability, this correlates positively with what is seen as the
Rogoff (1985) conservative choice of independent banker. When de Haan et al (1999)
compared their indicator with the updated Eijffinger & Schaling (1993) measure of CBI, they
found little evidence of any relationship between CBI and accountability, although the
correlation between CBI and the final responsibility measure of accountability had a strong
negative correlation.
Transparency focuses on whether asymmetric information is a good or bad thing. It is
discussed in its own right by Geraats (2002), and five aspects are distinguished: political,
economic, procedural, policy and operational. Political transparency is exemplified by
Svensson and Woodford (2003) who emphasise inflation targeting, while Walsh (2001)
covers contracts and Schaling and Nolan (2001) address preference uncertainty. Economic
transparency concerns information on economic data and forecasts; Cukierman (2001) and
Gersbach (2003) have shown how information on supply shocks removes the benefit supplied
by the Central Bank inflation/output trade-off. Amato et al (2002) and Pearlman (2005)
provide contrasting theoretical results on the benefits of full information on money supply
targets. Operational transparency has been discussed by Faust and Svensson (2001), and
involves the degree to which the imperfectness of control (i.e. the control error) over inflation
is revealed. Their additional focus on the indirect observability of central bank’s preferences
and objectives has its roots in Cukierman and Meltzer (1986). Procedural transparency
centres around individual voting records, and minutes of monetary policy committee
meetings; recent research on this has been done by Gerlach-Kristen (2002) and Spencer
(2005). Associated with this, is an analysis by Ehrmann and Fratzscher (2005) of the differing
effects of communication within the central bank committees of the ECB, Bank of England
and the Fed, and the response by financial markets. Policy transparency is the disclosure of
policy decisions and of likely future policy. Geraats (2002) makes the point that
“accountability directly affects the central bank’s incentives, whereas incentive effects of
transparency only operate indirectly through private sector expectations”. Some form of
transparency is therefore essential, for as Blinder (1998) argues, with central banks only
controlling the overnight rate, there needs to be some other mechanism by which monetary
policy can coordinate expectations. Note however that there is some motivation for central
banks not being fully transparent. Firstly, there is the potential for market participants to be
8unduly influenced by a central bank judgement that may (hopefully no more than
occasionally) be misguided (Amato and Shin, 2003). Secondly, there is a trade-off between
early publication of data and the discovery of subsequent error, and the consequent loss of
reputation due to the latter is likely to be the main factor in deciding not to be fully
transparent.
The creation of a measure of transparency, unlike that of CBI, requires considerably
more than the assessment of a single piece of legislation, and involves the examination of
information published by central banks and other government sources, and feedback from
senior officials at those banks. It has been achieved for nine major central banks by Eijffinger
and Geraats (2005), who have shown (Eijffinger and Geraats, 2004) that transparency is
associated with lower interest rates.
Overall then, the literature indicates that each of independence, accountability and
transparency has a role to play in the effectiveness of monetary policy. Our objective is to
update the measures of independence only, and in order to be as comprehensive as possible
we have chosen to update both of the main CBI indicators. There is a possibility that the
GMT indicator of CBI is preferable to both the Cukierman and the Alesina & Summers
indicators; a study by Hadri et al (1998) on the relationship between inflation, CBI and the
political business cycle showed that the GMT index gave more significant parameter
estimates. In addition, both the Alesina & Summers and the Cukierman indicators include
measures of accountability in them, namely the provision for dismissal of the governor. Since
our discussion has indicated that accountability and CBI represent differing or
complementary approaches to stabilisation and control of inflation, it may seem sensible to
separate them. However, there is still some overlap between the CBI and accountability
indicators, since they all contain features relating to final say over monetary policy and the
override mechanism. However, with GMT and Cukierman indices overwhelmingly
measuring independence, we have chosen to update these. We also update the turnover rate of
central bank governors (TOR) using data for the period 1991-2002, which will allow us to
provide a comparison with the TOR indices obtained by Cukierman (1992) and de Haan and
Kooi (2000) for the 1980s.
3. The Construction of CBI Indices
All the data that we employ is based on the latest central bank legislation, with the
dates of the laws listed in Table 1. We have utilised English translations, which are available
9from central bank websites. In certain cases, where the available legislation does not appear
to cover some of the criteria, we have examined central bank annual reports and monetary
policy statements, which are also available on these websites.
For the GMT index there are 15 criteria of CBI, while for the Cukierman index there
are 16. As far as possible, we have listed all the legal articles in each of the central banking
laws which are relevant to each of the criteria, and these will be available for every country in
our website5. The tabulation of the data also appears on the website. Apart from enabling our
indices to be more readily checked, we are motivated by Mangano (1998) who has pointed
out inconsistencies in the interpretation of banking legislation between GMT and CUK. Part
of our later analysis therefore involves establishing the correlation between the indices of
CBI. Mangano also discusses the differing criteria and weights of each of the criteria of the
indices, but this is not our concern here.
The various indices of CBI have focused on the institutional features, and have
ignored any behavioural indicators, in particular that of reputation. The latter is obviously
crucial, in that it affects expectations of wage and price setters in the economy, but it is not
easily measurable. Furthermore, behaviour is likely to be affected by the institutional
framework. Thus, to paraphrase our earlier discussion, the increasing popularity of central
bank independence in the industrialised world is due in large part to the view that central
bankers will have no incentive to stimulate growth temporarily in the run-up to election by an
increase in the money supply. This is notably the case if the term of office of the monetary
policy committee is not linked to the government’s term of office, but is of course linked to
all the CBI criteria.
(a) GMT index
Grilli et al (1991) divide their CBI index into political and economic criteria. The
political independence of a central bank is associated with how the members of the central
bank board are appointed, its relationship with government and its responsibilities. These
measures are all about autonomy, with the first four criteria covering the appointment of the
governor and the other members of the board and whether their appointments are for longer
than the usual duration of the government. Independence is enhanced if they are not
appointed by the government (or sovereign), and if they are appointed for a period longer
5 We are planning to set up a special website later this Summer which will include the central bank legislation
for all countries, as well as details on the construction of the LGT and CUK indices.
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than five years. The latter period is typical of the maximum length of office of most
democratically elected governments, although it fails to take account of the USA and New
Zealand where the length of office is only four years. As a consequence, we award New
Zealand a lower score than is accorded it by Dowd and Baker (1994), since both governor
and board are appointed for five-year terms.
The fifth political independence criterion concerns the presence of a government
representative on the board, with a score of zero whether or not that representative has voting
rights. There appears to be a possible ambiguity here, since the Bundesbank allows a non-
voting government representative. According to Grilli et al (1991), this was not the case prior
to 1991. It is surprising, given the Bundesbank’s record over the years in curbing inflation, to
view it as having become less politically independent over time. We have therefore departed
from Grilli et al (1991), and assigned a positive score if the government representative has no
voting rights. In the case of Belgium, the minister only has voting rights on non-ECB issues.
Since the only non-ECB issue is banking supervision, over which the Belgian central bank
has no say, it too receives a positive score. These criteria of the governor and of the board are
summarised in our website.
The sixth criterion measures whether government approval of monetary policy is
required; the scoring of this is often a matter of interpretation of somewhat ambiguous legal
phrasing. The seventh criterion is whether monetary or price stability is one of the goals of
the central bank. This is probably the only contentious criterion, in that it does not
differentiate between price stability and control of output. Thus if both are on the agenda, this
gets the same score as if price stability were the sole objective. However, if one views the
relationship between government and central bank within a principal-agent framework (e.g.
Persson & Tabellini, 1993, Walsh, 1995), then the objective of the government is to have the
bank pursue an unemployment/inflation trade-off while maintaining credibility. One might
therefore argue that price stability as the sole objective is inappropriate for a central bank.
The compromise is that any mention of price stability is accorded a positive score. There is a
further ambiguity when it comes to less developed countries or countries which have suffered
currency crises, so for example in the case of Banco de Mexico we see that ‘its primary
objective shall be to seek the stability of the purchasing power of [the] currency’.6 It is
difficult not to interpret this as in part a pursuit of price stability, but it is evidently a legal
article designed to focus the bank’s attention on the exchange rate. Nevertheless, we give
6Prior to 1998, the objective of the Dutch Central Bank was to regulate the guilder in a welfare-enhancing way.
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Mexico a positive score. The eighth criterion gives a positive score if there is an explicit legal
provision strengthening the bank when it is in conflict with the government; once again there
are cases where interpretation of the law is difficult, and is part of the reason we have lodged
our detailed scoring. One of the reasons for the UK not being constitutionally able to be part
of the European system of Central Banks is that under the 1998 legislation, the government is
permitted to override monetary policy in emergencies (Cranston, 1998). This provision is in
keeping with the analysis of Lohmann (1992), and is not out of step with some other
countries’ legislation.
The next set of criteria covers economic issues. The first five represent the ease of
access of government to central bank credit. The first four cover direct credit facilities, with
positive scores for these being non-automatic, at the market interest rate, being temporary,
and of limited amount. The fifth refers to the central bank not participating in the primary
market for public debt, and is again a little difficult to interpret in some of the legislation.
For the ESCB countries, Austria, Belgium, Finland, France, Germany, Ireland, Italy,
Netherlands, Portugal, Spain (Luxembourg being omitted from the tables) all such credit is
denied under ECB Article 21.1. All these countries are therefore given positive scores for
these five criteria. Although the indices are to a large extent irrelevant for those countries that
are now part of the European Central Bank, it may be of use to other researchers, so we
include them all for completeness. Clearly there is a common interest rate set by the ECB, but
the term structure of individual government debt can be set independently; in some countries
there is the equivalent of the UK’s Debt Management Office that is separate from the Bank of
England, so this aspect of independence may be irrelevant. Furthermore, banking supervision
differs in each of the ECB countries, so these two features could affect voting preferences at
monetary policy meetings, and also therefore the CBI index of the ECB.
The sixth criterion concerns whether the central bank sets the discount rate, while the
final criterion concerns supervision of the banking system. The issue here is about conflict of
interest. If banking failures could be triggered by an increase in the interest rate, the central
bank might be unwilling to undertake the monetary policy which is required at the
macroeconomic level. In addition, if banking failures did occur, the central bank might be
regarded as responsible, and this could undermine its reputation. Two stars are given if the
bank has no responsibility for banking supervision, and one star if it shares responsibility. Di
Noia & di Giorgio (1999) discuss several more arguments both for and against functional
separation of banking supervision and monetary policy. In a smaller sample of countries to
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ours (notably with the exclusion of Latin American and East European states) they find both
higher and more volatile inflation in countries where the central bank has sole responsibility
for banking supervision.
(b) CUK LVAU and LVAW Indices
The Cukierman CBI index shares the same objective of the GMT index in measuring
the legal independence of the central bank, so that it can be compared with those elsewhere
and over different periods of time. It also shares similar groupings of questions regarding
central bank operations in interpreting the various legal statutes.
However, while the GMT index is a simple binary zero or one answer to a set
question, the CUK index lays out a choice of preordained answers for each area of interest.
These are weighted, and those statements which are thought of as leading to greater
independence, are given a larger weight. Furthermore, the CUK index has a broader set of
questions within each sub-group.
Nevertheless, it should be stated at the outset, that this is not an easy task, being
dependent on the subjective interpretation of each country’s central bank law. As Cukierman
(1992, p 371) states:
“At times the spirit of the law and its application in practice are more
important than the letter of the law and its application in practice are more important
than the letter of the law. Ranking CB charters by their degree of legal independence
is therefore a difficult task involving an inescapable amount of subjective
judgement.”
The first step in constructing the index of independence is to interpret a number of
narrowly defined legal criteria. A corresponding code is given to the statement most
appropriate for that particular country. The legal criteria are sub-divided into four groups,
Chief Executive Officer, Policy Formulation, Final Objectives and Limitations on lending (to
the public sector). The resulting process gives sixteen criteria for each central bank law.
Unfortunately, because the variables are defined very narrowly, there is a problem
that some laws do not contain adequate information to answer each question, resulting in
missing values. To overcome this problem, Cukierman (1992) scores the CBI index as a
proportion of the criteria available.
The legal categories are as follows: Chief Executive Officer (CEO) group, made up of
term of office of CEO in years, who appoints the CEO, provisions for dismissal of CEO, and
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whether CEO allowed to hold another office; these are aggregated as one variable by
applying an unweighted mean.
The Policy formulations group, made up of who formulates monetary policy,
government directives and resolution of conflict, and whether the central bank is given an
active role in the formulation of government’s budget, are aggregated into a second variable
using a weighted mean. The weights are 0.25, 0.50 and 0.25 respectively.
The next five criteria are central bank objectives, limitations on advances, limitations
on securitized lending, terms of lending, and how wide is the circle of potential borrowers
from central bank. These are left unchanged as the next five variables.
The final four criteria: type of limit on loans to government when such a limit exists,
maturity of loans, restrictions on interest rates, and prohibition on lending in the primary
market, are aggregated into an eighth variable using an unweighted average.
It should be noted that in this paper we deviate slightly from the original coding
process. Following Cukierman et al. (2002, p242, Table 1, footnote b), where a government is
prohibited from borrowing at a central bank, that is advances to government are prohibited,
we also set the remaining lending variables equal to one.
Where there is no entry for a variable in one of the subgroups, the weight(s) of the
missing criterion/(a) is/(are) allocated proportionally to the remaining variables in the group
which contain a value.
With the eight variables at hand, a second round of aggregation takes place to
construct the two Cukierman (1992) indices. First, an unweighted index LVAU is calculated.
This is a simple average of the eight variables constructing in the first stage. Second, a
weighted index LVAW is computed. Here subjective weights are assigned to each of the
eight variables created in the second round of aggregation. These weights are 0.2, 0.15, 0.15,
0.15, 0.1, 0.1, 0.05 and 0.1 respectively.
(c) The Turnover rate of Governors Index (TOR)
The final measure of CBI is the turnover rate of governors (TOR), which is defined as
the average term of office of central bank governors7. It is calculated by dividing the number
of governors within a given period of time by the length of this reference period (expressed in
years). This excludes acting governors serving for an interim period without being formally
7 See Cukierman (1992) and de Haan and Kooi (2000).
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appointed to the position of governors. In addition, governors reappointed for a second or
third term will be counted only once.
4. Analysis of the CBI Indices
The results for the four measures of CBI are presented in Table 1, together with the
latest legislation on which the GMT, LVAU and LVAW indices are based. In the case of the
turnover rates of central bank governors (TOR) we construct two measures, one for the 1991-
2002 period and the other for the 1996-2002 period.
There are four main issues that need to be addressed for the indices that we have
created. The first is how countries are ranked by these CBI indices. The second is how
correlated are these indices. The third issue is how the updated indices compare with those
reported by previous studies, which could provide us with useful information about the trend
in granting central banks independence across countries. The final issue is how well the new
indices are correlated with inflation, which will be examined in the following section.
Tables 2-4 show the ranking of countries by the various indices. We divide the
countries into industrial and non-industrial in order to compare the experience of developing
countries to that of industrial countries. Looking at the GMT index, we notice that the mean
value is higher in the industrial than the developing countries, which implies a higher degree
of central bank independence in the developed countries. The latter also demonstrate a lower
variability for the GMT index. In the case of industrial countries, Sweden has the largest
index followed closely by Finland and Germany, while Denmark, Iceland, Japan, New
Zealand and Norway have the smallest indices. For the non-industrial countries, we notice
that some of the Central and Easter European countries display the largest indices and hence
the strongest degree of central bank independence, while India and Maldives come at the
bottom of the list.
The Cukierman indices (Table 3) confirm the finding with the GMT index; the
average values for both the LVAU and LVAW indices are larger for the industrial than the
non-industrial countries, thus supporting our expectation that the degree of central bank
independence is much stronger among the industrial than the developing countries. The
ranking of countries is similar for both the LVAU and LVAW indices, In the case of the
industrial countries, Spain shows the largest index followed by Finland and France, while
Norway has the lowest index, as with the GMT index.
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The TOR indicator (Table 4), which is supposed to be a better CBI measure for the
developing countries (de Haan and Kooi, 2000), provides further support for the proposition
that central bank independence is much stronger among the industrial than the developing
countries8 - the average TOR value for the industrial countries is considerably smaller than
for the non-industrial countries. The ranking of countries changes quite significantly from the
other indicators, with Greece now topping the list and the US coming at the bottom among
industrial countries9. In the case of non-industrialised countries, Brazil has the highest value
followed by Argentina, while seven countries have a zero value (indicating no change in the
governor of the central bank).
Tables 5 and 6 report the Pearson and Spearman10 correlations among our different
CBI indicators. Unsurprisingly, there is a very strong correlation between LVAU and LVAW
indices. More heartening is the strong correlation between the GMT index and LVAU and
LVAW. The correlation is consistently around 0.8 for both industrial and non-industrial
countries. On the other hand, for turnover rate, evaluated over various different time periods,
there is no significant correlation. Indeed apart from the case of the correlation between GMT
and TOR for industrialised countries, the correlation is almost never even negative! The
above results remain robust to the use of either linear or rank correlation coefficients.
In Table 7 we compare our GMT index with the GMT index obtained by Grilli et al
(1991) for those countries common in both studies11. It is interesting to note that our mean
index is considerably larger than that obtained by Grilli et al for the 1980s, which implies
greater CBI among industrial countries over the recent years. Greece, Portugal and Spain
appear to have experienced the strongest increase in central bank independence. We also note
that our indices are significantly less volatile than those of Grilli et al. The decomposition of
the index suggests that the increasing central bank independence among industrial countries
is due to both the political and economic components.
The significant increase in the degree of CBI not only among the industrial countries
but also among the developing countries is confirmed by the comparison of the Cukierman
indices for the countries common to both studies (Table 8). The average values of our LVAU
and LVAW indices (based on the latest legislation) are almost twice the size of those
8 Note that a higher value for TOR indicates lower level of central bank independence.
9 The value of zero for the USA reflects the fact that there was no change in the governor of the Federal Reserve
during the 1990s.
10 Pearson is the linear correlation coefficient, and Spearman is the rank correlation coefficient.
11 The comparison is restricted to industrial countries because neither Grilli et al (1992) nor any other study has
calculated the GMT index for developing countries.
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obtained by Cukierman (1992) on the basis of legislation available in the 1980s. Poland,
Spain, Belgium and Uruguay show the most significant increase in central bank
independence since the 1980s.
Table 9 compares our TOR indicator for the 1990s with those reported by Cukierman
(1992) and de Haan and Kooi (2000) for the 1980s. The last two studies calculated the TOR
measure only for developing countries. The average value of our TOR index is about 35-38%
lower than those reported by the previous two studies. For some countries (i.e. Argentina,
Botswana, Jamaica, Mexico, Morocco, Poland, Singapore, Venezuela) the TOR index is
reduced by over 50%. Our indices are also considerably less volatile than those for the 1980s.
These findings confirm those obtained with the Cukierman LVAU and LVAW indices; i.e.
CBI among developing countries became considerably stronger during the 1990s.
5. Central Bank Independence and Inflation
Now consider the relationship between the CBI measures and CPI inflation. Here we
have been careful to avoid the following potential pitfall: it is a reasonable hypothesis that a
period of high inflation might be followed by new central bank legislation which provides for
greater CBI. Thus if we use data on inflation prior to the latest legislation, the correlation
between inflation and the GMT and CUK measures of CBI could be biased upwards. All the
correlations that we provide on a year-by-year basis avoid this. For example, in Table 10, the
correlations between CPIM9802 and the GMT and CUK measures involve all countries with
no new legislation after 1997, and mean CPI inflation over the years 1998-2002.
In addition to listing in Table 10 the correlations for all the countries, in Tables 11 and
12 we also list the correlations for the industrial and non-industrial countries respectively.
Charts 1-3 give an indication of the correlations listed in the tables. As can be seen
from these three charts, there appears to be very little correlation between the GMT and
LVAU measures for countries with most recent legislation in 1996 and earlier, and
subsequent inflation over the period 1997-2002. The same appears to be the case for TOR
compared with inflation.
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Chart 1: G MT for 1996 Legislation and earlier vs CPI 97-02
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In Table 10, the fifth row directly tests the correlation between the data depicted in
Charts 1-3. It is evident that there is no significant correlation between CBI legislation and
subsequent inflation. Other rows of Table 10 correspond to different time periods and show a
similar lack of any significant relationship between CBI and inflation12. The reason that the
number of countries is lower for earlier periods is that we have only used the most recent CBI
legislation in our tests of correlation, so that most countries are therefore excluded from row
1; most of the recent legislation is post-1992. A similar table has been produced for the
Spearman rank correlation coefficient, from which similar conclusions were drawn.
What is particularly striking in row 1 is that if anything, high CBI scores are
associated with high inflation, completely counter to the accepted theory of ten years ago!
This counter-intuitive result is less prevalent among OECD countries, as we see in Table 11,
but nevertheless, even among these, there is no significant correlation between CBI measures
and inflation of any significance. A similar pattern of insignificant correlations for all sample
periods is observed among non-industrial countries.
12 When the TOR indicator of CBI is used, we notice significant correlations (at the 10% significance level)
between CBI and inflation for the short period of 2000-2002. However, when we split the sample between
industrial and non-industrial countries, even these correlations become insignificant.
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6. Conclusions
We have created a set of indices for 90 countries covering their most recent central
banking legislation. This study contains all the details of which legal articles were used to
score each criterion. This will enable subsequent researchers to both criticise us more readily
than they are able to criticise others who have created CBI indices, and also more easily to
update amendments to central banking legislation.
We have established that creating indices simultaneously for both the GMT and CUK
indices leads to a fairly high correlation between the two, and alleviates the problems
identified by Mangano (1998).
Our estimates of CBI indices show that on average the degree of CBI is much higher
among industrial countries than among developing countries.
We have compared the more recent measures of CBI with those of the past, and found
that there has been some relative movement among countries. Notably however, the average
level of CBI has increased considerably with the new legislation, which implies much
stronger and less volatile CBI among both industrial and developing countries. This increase
in CBI is particularly pronounced when we look at the Cukierman indices, whose average
values are almost twice the size of those obtained on the basis of central bank legislation
available in the 1980s.
We have shown that there is no significant correlation between CBI and subsequent
inflation either among industrial or among developing countries – if anything, the correlation
is in the wrong direction in certain sample periods. These empirical findings contrast sharply
with the earlier evidence that was based on the original CBI indices (obtained from the
legislation available in the 1980s) and inflation during the 1980s. The main implication of
this is that more research needs to be done to take into account other country specific issues
such as the labour market, as addressed by Berger et al (2002). The inclusion of country-
specific control variables is the subject of future research by the authors. In addition, this
preliminary work appears to indicate that further work on creating indices of accountability
and transparency is essential; if CBI is relatively unimportant for lowering inflation, then a
fuller assessment of the benefits of accountability and transparency is essential.
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Table 1
Scores for the GMT, LVAU and LVAW Indices for Each Country’s Most
Recent Legislation, and for the TOR Index (1991-2002 and 1996-2002)
Country Legislation
Date
GMT LVAU LVAW TOR 9102R TOR 9602R
Albania 1997 12 0.7247 0.7943 0.333 0.286
Algeria 1990 8 0.6114 0.5948 0.167 0.143
Argentina 1995 9 0.7822 0.7365 0.500 0.714
Armenia 2002 9 0.7847 0.8213 0.167 0.143
Aruba 1998 6 0.6004 0.5713 0.167 0.143
Australia 1998 9 0.3546 0.4000 0.083 0.143
Austria 1997 12 0.8744 0.8315 0.083 0.000
Azerbaijan 1996 8 0.7957 0.8110 0.083 0.000
Bahamas, The 2000 8 0.4918 0.5553 0.083 0.143
Belarus 2001 5 0.6413 0.5873 0.250 0.286
Belgium 1998 12 0.9166 0.8790 0.083 0.143
Botswana 1996 4 0.3425 0.3525 0.167 0.286
Brazil 2000 8 0.7063 0.6100 0.667 0.286
Bulgaria 1999 10 0.9558 0.9354 0.250 0.286
Canada 1996 10 0.4906 0.4884 0.167 0.143
Chile 2002 11 0.8691 0.8241 0.083 0.143
China - Hong Kong 1997 3 0.3138 0.2998 0.000 0.000
China - Mainland 1979 3 0.3033 0.4130 0.250 0.143
Croatia 2000 12 0.9400 0.9165 0.250 0.286
Czech Republic 1993 11 0.8589 0.8740 0.083 0.143
Denmark 1936 8 0.5450 0.5566 0.083 0.000
Egypt 1993 5 0.5002 0.4683 0.167 0.143
Estonia 1993 11 0.9384 0.9115 0.250 0.000
Finland 1998 14 0.9322 0.9040 0.167 0.143
France 1998 13 0.9322 0.9040 0.083 0.000
Georgia 2001 11 0.5956 0.6353 0.333 0.143
Germany 1997 14 0.9141 0.8750 0.250 0.143
Ghana 1992 4 0.3850 0.3961 0.167 0.286
Greece 1997 11 0.9322 0.9040 0.333 0.143
Hungary 1997 10 0.8736 0.8525 0.250 0.143
Iceland 1998 8 0.3509 0.3204 0.250 0.000
India 1949 2 0.3503 0.3565 0.167 0.143
Indonesia 1999 10 0.9634 0.9415 0.167 0.143
Ireland 1998 11 0.9244 0.8915 0.167 0.143
Israel 1988 6 0.4125 0.3880 0.083 0.143
Italy 1998 11 0.8803 0.8460 0.083 0.000
Jamaica 2001 6 0.5855 0.5467 0.250 0.143
Japan 1997 8 0.3955 0.4415 0.167 0.143
Kazakhstan 1995 7 0.3079 0.3613 0.417 0.429
Kenya 1996 7 0.6942 0.6598 0.167 0.143
Korea 1997 7 0.3182 0.3903 0.417 0.286
Kuwait 2003 5 0.4546 0.4885 0.000 0.000
Kyrgyz Republic 2000 13 0.9463 0.9240 0.167 0.143
Latvia 1992 11 0.9150 0.8865 0.083 0.143
Lithuania 1996 10 0.9228 0.8865 0.333 0.143
Malawi 1989 6 0.4986 0.5395 0.250 0.143
Malaysia 1994 5 0.2704 0.2931 0.250 0.286
Maldives 1981 2 0.1022 0.0978 0.000 0.000
Mauritius 1966 5 0.3636 0.3568 0.167 0.286
Mexico 1993 10 0.6063 0.5850 0.083 0.143
Moldovia 1995 9 0.6858 0.7322 0.000 0.000
Mongolia 1996 10 0.5534 0.6340 0.250 0.286
24
Morocco 1993 6 0.5369 0.5205 0.000 0.000
Namibia 1997 7 0.5441 0.5570 0.083 0.143
Netherlands 1998 12 0.9088 0.8665 0.083 0.143
New Zealand 1995 8 0.4422 0.4400 0.083 0.143
Nigeria 1999 6 0.5839 0.6580 0.167 0.143
Norway 1995 8 0.1765 0.2315 0.250 0.286
Pakistan 1956 5 0.3299 0.3482 0.167 0.143
Papua New Guinea 2000 10 0.5911 0.6203 0.417 0.429
Peru 1994 9 0.7891 0.7291 0.167 0.143
Philippines 1993 8 0.6521 0.6458 0.167 0.143
Poland 1997 12 0.9278 0.8988 0.250 0.143
Portugal 2001 10 0.8931 0.8415 0.250 0.143
Qatar 1997 6 0.4963 0.5257 0.000 0.000
Romania 1998 8 0.6400 0.6763 0.167 0.286
Russia 1999 9 0.9556 0.9290 0.250 0.286
Rwanda 1997 8 0.7382 0.7093 0.333 0.286
Serbia 2003 10 0.5961 0.6665 0.333 0.286
Singapore 1999 3 0.3146 0.3670 0.083 0.143
Slovak Republic 1999 12 0.6617 0.6974 0.167 0.143
Slovenia 1991 8 0.6515 0.7093 0.083 0.143
South Africa 2000 5 0.3125 0.3000 0.250 0.143
Spain 1998 12 0.9400 0.9165 0.167 0.143
Sri Lanka 1998 7 0.4958 0.5357 0.167 0.000
Sweden 1998 15 0.8994 0.8740 0.083 0.000
Switzerland 1997 11 0.6650 0.6025 0.167 0.286
Tanzania 1995 6 0.5828 0.5655 0.167 0.000
Thailand 1942 4 0.1696 0.1404 0.333 0.571
Trinidad 1986 5 0.4043 0.4493 0.250 0.286
Tunisia 1958 8 0.5425 0.5444 0.083 0.143
Turkey 1994 6 0.6900 0.7121 0.250 0.286
Uganda 1993 8 0.6129 0.6070 0.083 0.143
Ukraine 2000 10 0.8484 0.7816 0.333 0.286
United Arab Emirates 1980 8 0.6786 0.6568 0.000 0.000
United Kingdom 1998 11 0.8447 0.7990 0.083 0.000
United States 1995 12 0.5516 0.5133 0.000 0.000
Uruguay 1995 9 0.9188 0.9025 0.417 0.429
Venezuela 1992 12 0.9072 0.8740 0.250 0.143
Zambia 1996 6 0.5025 0.4650 0.333 0.143
Mean 8.4444 0.6378 0.6350 0.1870 0.1651
Variance 8.6092 0.0535 0.0459 0.0150 0.0169
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Table 2
GMT Index by Descending Order
(a) Industrial
Countries
(b) Non-Industrial
Countries
Country GMT Country GMT
Sweden 15 Kyrgyz Republic 13
Finland 14 Albania 12
Germany 14 Croatia 12
France 13 Poland 12
Austria 12 Slovak Republic 12
Belgium 12 Venezuela 12
Netherlands 12 Chile 11
Spain 12 Czech Republic 11
United States 12 Estonia 11
Greece 11 Georgia 11
Ireland 11 Latvia 11
Italy 11 Bulgaria 10
Switzerland 11 Hungary 10
United Kingdom 11 Indonesia 10
Canada 10 Lithuania 10
Portugal 10 Mexico 10
Australia 9 Mongolia 10
Denmark 8 Papua New Guinea 10
Iceland 8 Serbia 10
Japan 8 Ukraine 10
New Zealand 8 Argentina 9
Norway 8 Armenia 9
Moldovia 9
Mean 10.9090909 Peru 9
Variance 4.46753246 Russia 9
Uruguay 9
Algeria 8
Azerbaijan 8
Bahamas, The 8
Brazil 8
Philippines 8
Romania 8
Rwanda 8
Slovenia 8
Tunisia 8
Uganda 8
United Arab Emirates 8
Kazakhstan 7
Kenya 7
Korea 7
Namibia 7
Sri Lanka 7
Aruba 6
Israel 6
Jamaica 6
Malawi 6
Morocco 6
Nigeria 6
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Qatar 6
Tanzania 6
Turkey 6
Zambia 6
Belarus 5
Egypt 5
Kuwait 5
Malaysia 5
Mauritius 5
Pakistan 5
South Africa 5
Trinidad 5
Botswana 4
Ghana 4
Thailand 4
China - Hong Kong 3
China - Mainland 3
Singapore 3
India 2
Maldives 2
Mean 7.647058824
Variance 7.39596137
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Table 3
Cukierman Indices by descending Order
(a) Industrial
Countries
Country LVAU Country LVAW
Spain 0.94 Spain 0.9165
Finland 0.932188 Finland 0.904
France 0.932188 France 0.904
Greece 0.932188 Greece 0.904
Ireland 0.924375 Ireland 0.8915
Belgium 0.916563 Belgium 0.879
Germany 0.914063 Germany 0.875
Netherlands 0.90875 Sweden 0.874
Sweden 0.899375 Netherlands 0.8665
Portugal 0.893125 Italy 0.846
Italy 0.880313 Portugal 0.8415
Austria 0.874375 Austria 0.8315
United Kingdom 0.84469 United Kingdom 0.79900
Switzerland 0.665 Switzerland 0.6025
United States 0.551563 Denmark 0.556583
Denmark 0.545 United States 0.51325
Canada 0.490625 Canada 0.488375
New Zealand 0.442188 Japan 0.441458
Japan 0.395476 New Zealand 0.44
Australia 0.354583 Australia 0.400042
Iceland 0.350938 Iceland 0.320375
Norway 0.176458 Norway 0.231542
Mean 0.716546432 Mean 0.696664773
Variance 0.06316343 Variance 0.052141225
(b) Non-Industrial
Countries
Country LVAU Country LVAW
Indonesia 0.963438 Indonesia 0.9415
Bulgaria 0.955781 Bulgaria 0.935438
Russia 0.955625 Russia 0.929
Kyrgyz Republic 0.94625 Kyrgyz Republic 0.924
Croatia 0.94 Croatia 0.9165
Estonia 0.938438 Estonia 0.9115
Poland 0.927813 Uruguay 0.9025
Lithuania 0.922813 Poland 0.89875
Uruguay 0.91875 Latvia 0.8865
Latvia 0.915 Lithuania 0.8865
Venezuela 0.9071875 Czech Republic 0.874
Hungary 0.873571 Venezuela 0.874
Chile 0.8690625 Hungary 0.8525
Czech Republic 0.858928571 Chile 0.824125
Ukraine 0.848438 Armenia 0.82125
Azerbaijan 0.795714 Azerbaijan 0.811
Peru 0.789063 Albania 0.79425
Armenia 0.784688 Ukraine 0.781625
Argentina 0.782188 Argentina 0.7365
Rwanda 0.738214 Moldovia 0.732167
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Albania 0.724688 Peru 0.729125
Brazil 0.70625 Turkey 0.712125
Kenya 0.694167 Slovenia 0.709333
Turkey 0.69 Rwanda 0.70925
Moldovia 0.685833 Slovak Republic 0.697417
United Arab Emirates 0.678571 Romania 0.67625
Slovak Republic 0.661667 Serbia 0.6665
Philippines 0.652143 Kenya 0.659833
Slovenia 0.651548 Nigeria 0.658
Belarus 0.64125 United Arab
Emirates
0.65675
Romania 0.64 Philippines 0.64575
Uganda 0.612857 Georgia 0.63525
Algeria 0.611429 Mongolia 0.634
Mexico 0.60625 Papua New
Guinea
0.62025
Aruba 0.600357 Brazil 0.61
Serbia 0.596071 Uganda 0.607
Georgia 0.595625 Algeria 0.59475
Papua New Guinea 0.591071 Belarus 0.58725
Jamaica 0.585476 Mexico 0.585
Nigeria 0.583929 Aruba 0.57125
Tanzania 0.582813 Tanzania 0.5655
Mongolia 0.553438 Namibia 0.557
Namibia 0.544063 Bahamas, The 0.55525
Tunisia 0.5425 Jamaica 0.546667
Morocco 0.536875 Tunisia 0.544375
Zambia 0.5025 Malawi 0.5395
Egypt 0.500238 Sri Lanka 0.535667
Malawi 0.498571 Qatar 0.525667
Qatar 0.49631 Morocco 0.5205
Sri Lanka 0.495833 Kuwait 0.4885
Bahamas, The 0.491786 Egypt 0.468292
Kuwait 0.454643 Zambia 0.465
Israel 0.4125 Trinidad 0.449333
Trinidad 0.404306 China - Mainland 0.413
Ghana 0.385 Ghana 0.396125
Mauritius 0.363571 Korea 0.390333
India 0.350313 Israel 0.388
Botswana 0.3425 Singapore 0.367
Pakistan 0.329881 Kazakhstan 0.361333
Korea 0.318229 Mauritius 0.35675
Singapore 0.314583 India 0.3565
China - Hong Kong 0.31375 Botswana 0.3525
South Africa 0.3125 Pakistan 0.348167
Kazakhstan 0.307917 South Africa 0.3
China - Mainland 0.303333 China - Hong
Kong
0.29975
Malaysia 0.270357 Malaysia 0.293125
Thailand 0.169643 Thailand 0.140375
Maldives 0.102222 Maldives 0.097833
Mean 0.612357641 Mean 0.615010735
Variance 0.048560197 Variance 0.043012263
29
Table 4
TOR Index by Descending Order
(a) Industrial
Countries
Country TOR 9102R Country TOR 9602R
Greece 0.3333 Norway 0.2857
Germany 0.2500 Switzerland 0.2857
Iceland 0.2500 Australia 0.1429
Norway 0.2500 Belgium 0.1429
Portugal 0.2500 Canada 0.1429
Canada 0.1667 Finland 0.1429
Finland 0.1667 Germany 0.1429
Ireland 0.1667 Greece 0.1429
Japan 0.1667 Ireland 0.1429
Spain 0.1667 Japan 0.1429
Switzerland 0.1667 Netherlands 0.1429
Australia 0.0833 New Zealand 0.1429
Austria 0.0833 Portugal 0.1429
Belgium 0.0833 Spain 0.1429
Denmark 0.0833 Austria 0.0000
France 0.0833 Denmark 0.0000
Italy 0.0833 France 0.0000
Netherlands 0.0833 Iceland 0.0000
New Zealand 0.0833 Italy 0.0000
Sweden 0.0833 Sweden 0.0000
United Kingdom 0.0833 United Kingdom 0.0000
United States 0.0000 United States 0.0000
Mean 0.1439 Mean 0.1039
Variance 0.0067 Variance 0.0081
(b) Non-Industrial
Countries
Country TOR 9102R Country TOR 9602R
Brazil 0.6667 Argentina 0.7143
Argentina 0.5000 Thailand 0.5714
Kazakhstan 0.4167 Kazakhstan 0.4286
Korea 0.4167 Papua New Guinea 0.4286
Papua New Guinea 0.4167 Uruguay 0.4286
Uruguay 0.4167 Albania 0.2857
Albania 0.3333 Belarus 0.2857
Georgia 0.3333 Botswana 0.2857
Lithuania 0.3333 Brazil 0.2857
Rwanda 0.3333 Bulgaria 0.2857
Serbia 0.3333 Croatia 0.2857
Thailand 0.3333 Ghana 0.2857
Ukraine 0.3333 Korea 0.2857
Zambia 0.3333 Malaysia 0.2857
Belarus 0.2500 Mauritius 0.2857
Bulgaria 0.2500 Mongolia 0.2857
China - Mainland 0.2500 Romania 0.2857
Croatia 0.2500 Russia 0.2857
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Estonia 0.2500 Rwanda 0.2857
Hungary 0.2500 Serbia 0.2857
Jamaica 0.2500 Trinidad 0.2857
Malawi 0.2500 Turkey 0.2857
Malaysia 0.2500 Ukraine 0.2857
Mongolia 0.2500 Algeria 0.1429
Poland 0.2500 Armenia 0.1429
Russia 0.2500 Aruba 0.1429
South Africa 0.2500 Bahamas, The 0.1429
Trinidad 0.2500 Chile 0.1429
Turkey 0.2500 China - Mainland 0.1429
Venezuela 0.2500 Czech Republic 0.1429
Algeria 0.1667 Egypt 0.1429
Armenia 0.1667 Georgia 0.1429
Aruba 0.1667 Hungary 0.1429
Botswana 0.1667 India 0.1429
Egypt 0.1667 Indonesia 0.1429
Ghana 0.1667 Israel 0.1429
India 0.1667 Jamaica 0.1429
Indonesia 0.1667 Kenya 0.1429
Kenya 0.1667 Kyrgyz Republic 0.1429
Kyrgyz Republic 0.1667 Latvia 0.1429
Mauritius 0.1667 Lithuania 0.1429
Nigeria 0.1667 Malawi 0.1429
Pakistan 0.1667 Mexico 0.1429
Peru 0.1667 Namibia 0.1429
Philippines 0.1667 Nigeria 0.1429
Romania 0.1667 Pakistan 0.1429
Slovak Republic 0.1667 Peru 0.1429
Sri Lanka 0.1667 Philippines 0.1429
Tanzania 0.1667 Poland 0.1429
Azerbaijan 0.0833 Singapore 0.1429
Bahamas, The 0.0833 Slovak Republic 0.1429
Chile 0.0833 Slovenia 0.1429
Czech Republic 0.0833 South Africa 0.1429
Israel 0.0833 Tunisia 0.1429
Latvia 0.0833 Uganda 0.1429
Mexico 0.0833 Venezuela 0.1429
Namibia 0.0833 Zambia 0.1429
Singapore 0.0833 Azerbaijan 0.0000
Slovenia 0.0833 China - Hong Kong 0.0000
Tunisia 0.0833 Estonia 0.0000
Uganda 0.0833 Kuwait 0.0000
China - Hong Kong 0.0000 Maldives 0.0000
Kuwait 0.0000 Moldovia 0.0000
Maldives 0.0000 Morocco 0.0000
Moldovia 0.0000 Qatar 0.0000
Morocco 0.0000 Sri Lanka 0.0000
Qatar 0.0000 Tanzania 0.0000
United Arab Emirates 0.0000 United Arab Emirates 0.0000
Mean 0.2010 Mean 0.1849
Variance 0.0170 Variance 0.0183
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Table 5
Correlations for All Indices: Industrial Countries (Pearson and Spearman Rank)
Correlations
1 .789** .784** -.173 -.052 -.198 -.092
. .000 .000 .442 .820 .377 .682
22 22 22 22 22 22 22
.789** 1 .995** -.039 .116 -.221 .048
.000 . .000 .863 .607 .322 .832
22 22 22 22 22 22 22
.784** .995** 1 -.035 .111 -.208 .042
.000 .000 . .876 .623 .352 .852
22 22 22 22 22 22 22
-.173 -.039 -.035 1 .776** .488* .543**
.442 .863 .876 . .000 .021 .009
22 22 22 22 22 22 22
-.052 .116 .111 .776** 1 -.173 .107
.820 .607 .623 .000 . .442 .635
22 22 22 22 22 22 22
-.198 -.221 -.208 .488* -.173 1 .700**
.377 .322 .352 .021 .442 . .000
22 22 22 22 22 22 22
-.092 .048 .042 .543** .107 .700** 1
.682 .832 .852 .009 .635 .000 .
22 22 22 22 22 22 22
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
GRILLI
LVAU
LVAW
TOR 9102R
TOR 9195R
TOR 9602R
TOR 9902R
GMT LVAU LVAW TOR 9102R TOR 9195R TOR 9602R TOR 9902R
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).**.
Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).*.
Correlations
1.000 .761** .757** -.231 -.047 -.198 -.125
. .000 .000 .301 .835 .378 .581
22 22 22 22 22 22 22
.761** 1.000 .995** .059 .176 -.014 .173
.000 . .000 .794 .433 .951 .442
22 22 22 22 22 22 22
.757** .995** 1.000 .060 .201 -.039 .144
.000 .000 . .792 .369 .862 .522
22 22 22 22 22 22 22
-.231 .059 .060 1.000 .700** .544** .559**
.301 .794 .792 . .000 .009 .007
22 22 22 22 22 22 22
-.047 .176 .201 .700** 1.000 -.181 .095
.835 .433 .369 .000 . .420 .673
22 22 22 22 22 22 22
-.198 -.014 -.039 .544** -.181 1.000 .712**
.378 .951 .862 .009 .420 . .000
22 22 22 22 22 22 22
-.125 .173 .144 .559** .095 .712** 1.000
.581 .442 .522 .007 .673 .000 .
22 22 22 22 22 22 22
Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
GRILLI
LVAU
LVAW
TOR 9102R
TOR 9195R
TOR 9602R
TOR 9902R
Spearman's rho
GMT LVAU LVAW TOR 9102R TOR 9195R TOR 9602R TOR 9902R
Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed).**.
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Table 6
Correlations for All Indices: Non - Industrial Countries (Pearson and Spearman Rank)
Correlations
1 .827** .850** .213 .231 .081 .110
. .000 .000 .081 .058 .509 .373
68 68 68 68 68 68 68
.827** 1 .983** .148 .208 .001 .088
.000 . .000 .227 .089 .991 .474
68 68 68 68 68 68 68
.850** .983** 1 .129 .189 -.009 .069
.000 .000 . .294 .122 .941 .573
68 68 68 68 68 68 68
.213 .148 .129 1 .802** .712** .466**
.081 .227 .294 . .000 .000 .000
68 68 68 68 68 68 68
.231 .208 .189 .802** 1 .151 .081
.058 .089 .122 .000 . .220 .512
68 68 68 68 68 68 68
.081 .001 -.009 .712** .151 1 .676**
.509 .991 .941 .000 .220 . .000
68 68 68 68 68 68 68
.110 .088 .069 .466** .081 .676** 1
.373 .474 .573 .000 .512 .000 .
68 68 68 68 68 68 68
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Pearson Correlation
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
GRILLI
LVAU
LVAW
TOR 9102R
TOR 9195R
TOR 9602R
TOR 9902R
GMT LVAU LVAW TOR 9102R TOR 9195R TOR 9602R TOR 9902R
Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).**.
Correlations
1.000 .820** .855** .210 .259* .085 .067
. .000 .000 .086 .033 .492 .585
68 68 68 68 68 68 68
.820** 1.000 .975** .152 .215 .041 .039
.000 . .000 .215 .078 .739 .750
68 68 68 68 68 68 68
.855** .975** 1.000 .163 .219 .056 .045
.000 .000 . .185 .073 .653 .714
68 68 68 68 68 68 68
.210 .152 .163 1.000 .808** .711** .407**
.086 .215 .185 . .000 .000 .001
68 68 68 68 68 68 68
.259* .215 .219 .808** 1.000 .208 .126
.033 .078 .073 .000 . .089 .307
68 68 68 68 68 68 68
.085 .041 .056 .711** .208 1.000 .588**
.492 .739 .653 .000 .089 . .000
68 68 68 68 68 68 68
.067 .039 .045 .407** .126 .588** 1.000
.585 .750 .714 .001 .307 .000 .
68 68 68 68 68 68 68
Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
Correlation Coefficient
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
GRILLI
LVAU
LVAW
TOR 9102R
TOR 9195R
TOR 9602R
TOR 9902R
Spearman's rho
GMT LVAU LVAW TOR 9102R TOR 9195R TOR 9602R TOR 9902R
Correlation is significant at the .01 level (2-tailed).**.
Correlation is significant at the .05 level (2-tailed).*.
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Table 7
Comparison with Grilli et al’s (1991) GMT Indices
Country GMT 1991 Current Study Difference
Australia 9 9 0
Austria 9 12 3
Belgium 7 12 5
Canada 11 10 -1
Denmark 8 8 0
France 7 13 6
Germany 13 14 1
Greece 4 11 7
Ireland 7 11 4
Italy 5 11 6
Japan 6 8 2
Netherlands 10 12 2
New Zealand 3 8 5
Portugal 3 10 7
Spain 5 12 7
Switzerland 12 11 -1
United Kingdom 6 11 5
United States 12 12 0
Mean 7.6111 10.8333
Variance 9.6634 2.9706
Political
Component
Country GMT 1991 Current Study Difference
Australia 3 4 1
Austria 3 4 1
Belgium 1 4 3
Canada 4 4 0
Denmark 3 3 0
France 2 6 4
Germany 6 6 0
Greece 2 5 3
Ireland 3 5 2
Italy 4 6 2
Japan 1 4 3
Netherlands 6 6 0
New Zealand 0 3 3
Portugal 1 4 3
Spain 2 6 4
Switzerland 5 4 -1
United Kingdom 1 3 2
United States 5 5 0
Mean 2.8889 4.5556
Variance 3.2810 1.2026
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Economic
Component
Country GMT 1991 Current Study Difference
Australia 6 5 -1
Austria 6 8 2
Belgium 6 8 2
Canada 7 6 -1
Denmark 5 5 0
France 5 7 2
Germany 7 8 1
Greece 2 6 4
Ireland 4 6 2
Italy 1 4 3
Japan 5 4 -1
Netherlands 4 6 2
New Zealand 3 5 2
Portugal 2 6 4
Spain 3 6 3
Switzerland 7 7 0
United Kingdom 5 8 3
United States 7 7 0
Mean 4.7222 6.2222
Variance 3.6242 1.7124
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Table 8
Comparison with Cukierman’s (1992) Indices
(a) LVAU Index
Country CUK Current Study Difference
Argentina 0.43906 0.78219 0.34313
Australia 0.30552 0.35458 0.04906
Austria 0.58063 0.87438 0.29375
Bahamas 0.45094 0.49179 0.04085
Belgium 0.18875 0.91656 0.72781
Botswana 0.36063 0.34250 -0.01812
Brazil 0.25542 0.70625 0.45083
Canada 0.45656 0.49063 0.03406
Chile 0.49229 0.86906 0.37677
China 0.28278 0.30333 0.02056
Denmark 0.46552 0.54500 0.07948
Egypt 0.53125 0.50024 -0.03101
Finland 0.26952 0.93219 0.66266
France 0.27938 0.93219 0.65281
Germany 0.65719 0.91406 0.25688
Ghana 0.28219 0.38500 0.10281
Greece 0.51031 0.93219 0.42188
Hungary 0.23969 0.87357 0.63388
Iceland 0.35948 0.35094 -0.00854
India 0.33063 0.35031 0.01969
Indonesia 0.31719 0.96344 0.64625
Ireland 0.38619 0.92438 0.53818
Israel 0.42469 0.41250 -0.01219
Italy 0.21821 0.88031 0.66210
Japan 0.15726 0.39548 0.23821
Kenya 0.44063 0.69417 0.25354
Korea 0.23240 0.31823 0.08583
Malaysia 0.33500 0.27036 -0.06464
Mexico 0.35594 0.60625 0.25031
Morocco 0.15698 0.53688 0.37990
Netherlands 0.42281 0.90875 0.48594
New Zealand 0.26865 0.44219 0.17354
Nigeria 0.33344 0.58393 0.25049
Norway 0.13656 0.17646 0.03990
Pakistan 0.19458 0.32988 0.13530
Peru 0.43000 0.78906 0.35906
Philippines 0.41813 0.65214 0.23402
Poland 0.09604 0.92781 0.83177
Qatar 0.17698 0.49631 0.31933
Romania 0.28806 0.64000 0.35194
Singapore 0.26944 0.31458 0.04514
South Africa 0.30052 0.31250 0.01198
Spain 0.20688 0.94000 0.73313
Sweden 0.27250 0.89938 0.62688
Switzerland 0.67262 0.66500 -0.00762
Tanzania 0.47875 0.58281 0.10406
Thailand 0.26344 0.16964 -0.09379
Turkey 0.43656 0.69000 0.25344
Uganda 0.37036 0.61286 0.24250
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United Kingdom 0.30875 0.84469 0.53594
United States 0.50490 0.55156 0.04667
Uruguay 0.21917 0.91875 0.69958
Venezuela 0.37344 0.90719 0.53375
Zambia 0.30563 0.50250 0.19688
Mean 0.34278 0.62420
Variance 0.01635 0.05938
(b) LVAW Index
Country CUK Current Study Difference
Argentina 0.40013 0.73650 0.33638
Australia 0.35454 0.40004 0.04550
Austria 0.61375 0.83150 0.21775
Bahamas 0.41125 0.55525 0.14400
Belgium 0.16450 0.87900 0.71450
Botswana 0.32725 0.35250 0.02525
Brazil 0.20858 0.61000 0.40142
Canada 0.45063 0.48838 0.03775
Chile 0.45946 0.82413 0.36467
China 0.26500 0.41300 0.14800
Denmark 0.49192 0.55658 0.06467
Egypt 0.49263 0.46829 -0.02433
Finland 0.28038 0.90400 0.62363
France 0.24063 0.90400 0.66338
Germany 0.69488 0.87500 0.18013
Ghana 0.30563 0.39613 0.09050
Greece 0.55513 0.90400 0.34888
Hungary 0.24313 0.85250 0.60938
Iceland 0.34371 0.32038 -0.02333
India 0.33650 0.35650 0.02000
Indonesia 0.26838 0.94150 0.67313
Ireland 0.42558 0.89150 0.46592
Israel 0.38963 0.38800 -0.00162
Italy 0.25050 0.84600 0.59550
Japan 0.17458 0.44146 0.26687
Kenya 0.43525 0.65983 0.22458
Korea 0.26992 0.39033 0.12042
Malaysia 0.35925 0.29313 -0.06613
Mexico 0.34246 0.58500 0.24254
Morocco 0.14392 0.52050 0.37658
Netherlands 0.41888 0.86650 0.44763
New Zealand 0.24317 0.44000 0.19683
Nigeria 0.36813 0.65800 0.28988
Norway 0.17038 0.23154 0.06117
Pakistan 0.21117 0.34817 0.13700
Peru 0.43163 0.72913 0.29750
Philippines 0.43288 0.64575 0.21288
Poland 0.10396 0.89875 0.79479
Qatar 0.20121 0.52567 0.32446
Romania 0.30033 0.67625 0.37592
Singapore 0.29617 0.36700 0.07083
South Africa 0.24617 0.30000 0.05383
Spain 0.23088 0.91650 0.68563
Sweden 0.29450 0.87400 0.57950
Switzerland 0.64375 0.60250 -0.04125
37
Tanzania 0.43938 0.56550 0.12613
Thailand 0.26450 0.14038 -0.12413
Turkey 0.45538 0.71213 0.25675
Uganda 0.37725 0.60700 0.22975
United Kingdom 0.26525 0.79900 0.53375
United States 0.47392 0.51325 0.03933
Uruguay 0.24196 0.90250 0.66054
Venezuela 0.42713 0.87400 0.44688
Zambia 0.32563 0.46500 0.13938
Mean 0.34375 0.61562
Variance 0.01609 0.04959
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Table 9
Comparison of TOR indices with Cukierman (1992) and de Haan and Kooi (2000)
Country TOR 9102R TOR 9602R TOR (CUK) TOR (H&K)
Algeria 0.167 0.143 na 0.3
Argentina 0.500 0.714 1 1.1
Bahamas, The 0.083 0.143 0.2 0.2
Botswana 0.167 0.286 0.4 0.4
Brazil 0.667 0.286 0.8 0.8
Chile 0.083 0.143 0.8 0.8
China 0.250 0.143 0.3 na
Egypt 0.167 0.143 0.3 0.1
Ghana 0.167 0.286 0.2 0.2
Greece 0.333 0.143 0.2 0.2
Hungary 0.250 0.143 0.1 na
India 0.167 0.143 0.3 0.4
Indonesia 0.167 0.143 0.2 0.2
Israel 0.083 0.143 0.2 na
Jamaica 0.250 0.143 na 0.5
Kenya 0.167 0.143 0.2 0.1
Korea 0.417 0.286 0.5 0.5
Kuwait 0.000 0.000 na 0.2
Malawi 0.250 0.143 na 0.3
Malaysia 0.250 0.286 0.2 0.2
Maldives 0.000 0.000 na 0.1
Mauritius 0.167 0.286 na 0.1
Mexico 0.083 0.143 0.3 0.3
Morocco 0.000 0.000 0.2 0.2
Nigeria 0.167 0.143 0.1 0.1
Pakistan 0.167 0.143 0.3 0.4
Peru 0.167 0.143 0.3 0.3
Philippines 0.167 0.143 0.2 0.2
Poland 0.250 0.143 0.5 na
Portugal 0.250 0.143 0.3 na
Qatar 0.000 0.000 0 0
Romania 0.167 0.286 0.2 na
Singapore 0.083 0.143 0.6 0.6
South Africa 0.250 0.143 na 0.1
Sri Lanka 0.167 0.000 na 0.1
Tanzania 0.167 0.000 0.1 0.1
Thailand 0.333 0.571 0.1 0.1
Trinidad 0.250 0.286 na 0.3
Tunisia 0.083 0.143 na 0.4
Turkey 0.250 0.286 0.4 0.3
Uganda 0.083 0.143 0.2 0.2
Uruguay 0.417 0.429 0.3 0.3
Venezuela 0.250 0.143 0.5 0.5
Zambia 0.333 0.143 0.5 0.4
Mean 0.201 0.182 0.323 0.305
Variance 0.0175 0.0193 0.0485 0.0524
Note: TOR (CUK )and TOR (H&K) indicate the Cukierman and de Haan & Kooi measures
respectively. Both these indicators are for the period 1980-1989, while our indicator covers
the periods 1991-2002 and 1996-2002 respectively.
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Table 10
Correlation Between CBI Indexes and Mean of Price Inflation
for Corresponding Sample Period
Legislation Inflation
Variable
Statistical Test GMT LVAU LVAW TOR9102R TOR9195R TOR9602R TOR9902R
Pre and 1992 CPIM9302 Pearson
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
0.483
0.058
16
0.583*
0.018
16
0.573*
0.020
16
0.272
0.308
16
0.404
0.121
16
-0.034
0.902
16
0.335
0.204
16
Pre and 1993 CPIM9402 Pearson
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
0.327
0.127
23
0.357
0.095
23
0.357
0.094
23
0.373
0.80
23
0.408
0.053
23
0.037
0.867
23
0.168
0.443
23
Pre and 1994 CPIM9502 Pearson
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
0.136
0.506
26
0.292
0148
26
0.313
0.120
26
0.353
0.077
26
0.259
0.201
26
0.180
0.378
26
0.166
0.417
26
Pre and 1995 CPIM9602 Pearson
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
0.074
0.679
34
0.272
0.120
34
0.302
0.083
34
0.192
0.276
34
0.221
0.208
34
0.083
0.641
34
0.013
0.941
34
Pre and 1996 CPIM9702 Pearson
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
-0.007
0.996
41
0.166
0.299
41
0.193
0.226
41
0.207
0.194
41
0.187
0.247
41
0.113
0.483
41
0.062
0.702
41
Pre and 1997 CPIM9802 Pearson
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
-0.060
0.664
54
0.110
0.427
54
0.137
0.323
54
0.171
0.216
54
0.126
0.364
54
0.124
0.370
54
0.114
0.411
54
Pre and 1998 CPIM9902 Pearson
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
-0.136
0.269
68
0.012
0.924
68
0.046
0.707
68
0.159
0.196
68
0.044
0.721
68
0.179
0.144
68
0.238
0.051
68
Pre and 1999 CPIM0002 Pearson
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
-0.110
0.352
74
0.068
0.566
74
0.102
0.386
74
0.216
0.064
74
0.069
0.559
74
0.235*
0.044
74
0.276*
0.017
74
Pre and 2000 CPIM0102 Pearson
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
-0.113
0.320
80
0.073
0.522
80
0.099
0.381
80
0.257*
0.021
80
0.105
0.354
80
0.287**
0.010
80
0.310*
0.05
80
**. Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed).
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
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Table 11
Correlation for Industrial Countries between CBI Indexes
and Mean of Price Inflation for Corresponding Sample Period
Legislation Inflation
Variable
Statistical Test GMT LVAU LVAW TOR9102R TOR9195R TOR9602R TOR9902R
Pre and 1995 CPIM9602 Pearson
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
0.492
0.508
4
0.135
0.865
4
0.149
0.851
4
-0.074
0.926
4
0.421
0.579
4
-0.351
0.649
4
-0.715
0.285
4
Pre and 1996 CPIM9702 Pearson
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
0.111
0.860
5
-0.220
0.723
5
-0.185
0.766
5
0.144
0.818
5
0.443
0.455
5
-0.094
0.880
5
-0.543
0.344
5
Pre and 1997 CPIM9802 Pearson
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
0.063
0.863
10
0.170
0.638
10
0.173
0.632
10
0.171
0.638
10
0.372
0.290
10
-0.198
0.583
10
0.234
0.516
10
Pre and 1998 CPIM9902 Pearson
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
-0.179
0.437
21
-0.037
0.873
21
-0.058
0.804
21
0.186
0.421
21
0.300
0.186
21
-0.125
0.591
21
0.059
0.799
21
Pre and 1999 CPIM0002 Pearson
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
-0.156
0.500
21
-0.014
0.952
21
-0.034
0.885
21
0.152
0.511
21
0.267
0.243
21
-0.130
0.574
21
0.067
0.772
21
Pre and 2000 CPIM0102 Pearson
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
-0.119
0.608
21
0.026
0.911
21
0.006
0.978
21
0.163
0.481
21
0.306
0.178
21
-0.167
0.470
21
0.046
0.842
21
Table 12
Correlation for Non-Industrial Countries between CBI Indexes
and Mean of Price Inflation for Corresponding Sample Period
Legislation Inflation
Variable
Statistical Test GMT LVAU LVAW TOR9102R TOR9195R TOR9602R TOR9902R
Pre and 1992 CPIM9302 Pearson
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
0.548*
0.034
15
0.625*
0.013
15
0.615*
0.015
15
0.229
0.411
15
0.443
0.098
15
-0.130
0.644
15
0.255
0.360
15
Pre and 1993 CPIM9402 Pearson
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
0.350
0.110
22
0.365
0.095
22
0.367
0.093
22
0.355
0.105
22
0.429*
0.046
22
-0.012
0.956
22
0.115
0.611
22
Pre and 1994 CPIM9502 Pearson
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
0.149
0.476
25
0.295
0.152
25
0.318
0.122
25
0.339
0.097
25
0.270
0.191
25
0.152
0.467
25
0.130
0.534
25
Pre and 1995 CPIM9602 Pearson
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
0.139
0.463
30
0.248
0.186
30
0.278
0.137
30
0.159
0.402
30
0.203
0.281
30
0.048
0.800
30
-0.026
0.892
30
Pre and 1996 CPIM9702 Pearson
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
0.056
0.747
36
0.135
0.432
36
0.162
0.345
36
0.177
0.302
36
0.168
0.326
36
0.084
0.628
36
0.039
0.820
36
Pre and 1997 CPIM9802 Pearson
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
0.047
0.761
44
0.134
0.388
44
0.156
0.312
44
0.156
0.313
44
0.132
0.393
44
0.098
0.528
44
0.087
0.573
44
Pre and 1998 CPIM9902 Pearson
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
0.044
0.768
47
0.116
0.439
47
0.149
0.317
47
0.108
0.470
47
0.029
0.846
47
0.124
0.405
47
0.190
0.201
47
Pre and 1999 CPIM0002 Pearson
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
0.069
0.623
53
0.167
0.231
53
0.198
0.156
53
0.175
0.209
53
0.062
0.661
53
0.189
0.176
53
0.241
0.083
53
Pre and 2000 CPIM0102 Pearson
Sig. (2-tailed)
N
0.046
0.731
59
0.162
0.221
59
0.184
0.162
59
0.214
0.103
59
0.085
0.521
59
0.249
0.057
59
0.279*
0.032
59
*. Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed).
